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POPULIST OUTRAGE, RECKLESS EMPIRICS: A 
REVIEW OF FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 
Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre* 
INTRODUCTION 
Brian Tamanaha’s Failing Law Schools (University of Chicago Press 
2012) is a blistering critique of legal education and a rallying cry for radical 
reform. As readers flip through this well-written sermon, they can 
practically smell the brimstone. Professor Tamanaha’s argument is that 
legal education has become too expensive to justify its cost, particularly for 
graduates considering a career in public service, and that this problem can 
best be addressed by increasing faculty teaching loads, reducing support for 
legal scholarship, slashing faculty compensation, and reducing the 
availability of protections such as tenure. He is particularly critical of 
nonelite law schools, whose graduates on average earn less than graduates 
of elite schools, but his proposed reforms would leave few unscathed.1 
Professor Tamanaha’s critique of legal education is not without 
precedent. Similar criticisms of universities have been made by many 
conservatives.2 The importance of Professor Tamanaha’s critique of the 
legal academy is perhaps not its novelty but rather its author’s status. 
Tamanaha is not a raider lobbing bombs across the parapets—he is an 
inside man: a former law school interim dean, a scholar in the field of legal 
theory, and a tenured professor at the top-thirty-ranked Washington 
University in St. Louis. Working from the inside, Tamanaha has the 
potential to fracture the academy, pitting elite schools against the rest,3 big 
against small,4 urban against rural,5 private against public;6 to pit faculty 
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1
  BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 180 (2012) (proposing to cap federal student loans 
to shrink the resources available to elite law schools such as Harvard and Columbia). 
2
  See, e.g., GLENN HARLAN REYNOLDS, THE HIGHER EDUCATION BUBBLE (2012); NAOMI 
SCHAEFER RILEY, THE FACULTY LOUNGES: AND OTHER REASONS WHY YOU WON’T GET THE 
COLLEGE EDUCATION YOU PAID FOR (2011); RICHARD VEDDER, GOING BROKE BY DEGREE: WHY 
COLLEGE COSTS TOO MUCH (2004); William J. Bennett, Op-Ed., Our Greedy Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 18, 1987, at A31. 
3
  See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 21–27 (accusing elite law schools of creating accreditation 
standards that favor them); id. at 171–72 (“In an elite-focused legal academy and legal profession, to put 
it frankly, no one cares about these people [who attended mid- and lower ranked schools] or those types 
of jobs [they do].”). 
4
  See id. at 180. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N U N I V E R S I T Y L A W R E V I E W O N L I N E 
 177 
against each other—clinicians against researchers,7 the young against the 
experienced,8 conservatives against liberals;9 to pit students against their 
teachers,10 and ultimately to turn the voting public against law students and 
the legal profession.11 
Professor Tamanaha started his battle against tenured faculty in the late 
1990s when he served as an interim dean of St. John’s University School of 
Law in Queens, New York.12 He eliminated summer research stipends for 
most faculty, forced out some of his colleagues, and held the line on tuition 
increases for one year.13 In Tamanaha’s recounting, he rescued the law 
school from an entrenched gerontocracy of unproductive and overpaid 
faculty and reversed a slide in its academic ranking.14 
In Failing Law Schools, Tamanaha generalizes from his early 
experience at St. John’s to conclude that the problem with legal education is 
that most faculty members are overpaid and unproductive.15 Professor 
Tamanaha argues that scholarly productivity should be a low priority 
outside a thin firmament of elite schools.16 
According to Tamanaha, law schools have priced themselves above 
their economic value,17 and prospective students will no longer put up with 
 
5
  See id. at 112, 131. 
6
  See id. at 184. 
7
  See id. at 33 (“Despite [clinical teachers’] second-class status . . . , the pay is good and work 
conditions are good enough . . . .”); id. at 34 (“Clinicians relentlessly criticize the emphasis on 
scholarship in law schools, yet now they hanker to do it themselves in order to qualify for tenure.”); id. 
at 48–52, 59–60, 126, 173, 175; id. at 50 (protesting incentive compensation tied to research 
productivity on the grounds that “[a] mercenary pay-me-to-write quality attaches to these grants” and 
speculating that research grants suggest a “lack of an intrinsic desire on the part of the scholar to write”). 
8
  See id. at 186–87. 
9
  See id. at 35 (“[L]iberal law professors . . . are the ones staking out the higher cost position” 
because they “apparently have blinders on” as to the “consequence[s].”); id. at 143 (“Liberal law 
professors, especially, will be rankled at the suggestion that the key consideration for a prospective law 
student is to aim at getting a corporate law job.”). 
10
  See id. at 48 (“[L]aw professors have been doing swimmingly well compared to most lawyers for 
some time now. . . . Even with high salaries, faculties can revolt over money.”); id. at 52 (asserting that 
faculty “have artificially boosted their salaries in classic rent-seeking terms”); id. at 176 (“[E]ntrenched 
economic interests, especially . . . law professors and law schools, will conspire against [reform].”). 
11
  See id. at 14 (savoring “[a] delicious irony: the preeminent professional organization of lawyers 
complaining that it must endure an injustice because legal costs are too high”); id. at 107–08 
(approvingly quoting a description of indebted law graduates as motivated “by the ‘single-minded 
objective of milking the profession for all it is worth’” to repay their debts (quoting John R. Kramer, 
Will Legal Education Remain Affordable, by Whom, and How?, 1987 DUKE L.J. 240, 241)). 
12
  Id. at 1–3. 
13
  Id. at 6–7. 
14
  Id. at 1–8. It is difficult for an outsider to assess these claims. 
15
  Id. at 46–53. 
16
  Id. at 60–61. 
17
  See id. at 107–44. 
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it.18 When the level of exploitation by the rentier class of law school faculty 
is revealed to the underclass of students,19 the system will either collapse 
under its own weight or be forced to undertake radical reform.20 Or to put it 
in nonmaterialist terms: repent law professor, for the end is nigh. 
I. TAMANAHA’S PROPOSAL: STARVE THE BEAST 
Like any secular revolutionary or radical preacher, Tamanaha closes by 
laying out a path to salvation. Tamanaha argues that nonelite law schools 
should transform themselves into the Motel 6 of legal education:21 staffed 
by a low-paid, itinerant workforce of part-time adjuncts; engineered to 
minimize costs; and focused primarily on serving the needs of the poor.22 If 
the professoriate will not voluntarily accept a large pay cut, then some 
external power should force it upon them: the American Bar Association 
(ABA) should lower accreditation standards,23 or the states should reduce 
licensing requirements,24 and with the floodgates open, free market 
competition will take care of the rest. 
If bar associations and states are not willing to experiment with 
extensive free-market reforms, Tamanaha hopes that the federal 
government will cap access to student loans to prevent law students from 
borrowing against their future earnings to invest in a legal education.25 
Tamanaha also proposes cuts to federal debt forgiveness programs. 
Although he describes the lack of legal services for the poor as a crisis,26 he 
worries about federal student loan forgiveness programs—which subsidize 
graduates who work in public service or who have low incomes because 
they serve the poor—on the grounds that these programs may require an 
investment from taxpayers without imposing sufficient pain on professors.27 
 
18
  Id. at 160–66. 
19
  Id. at 51–52 (suggesting that faculty “have artificially boosted their salaries in classic rent-
seeking terms.”); id. at 53 (Law professors’ “quality of life is far better than that of lawyers, and we 
make more money than most lawyers.”); id. at 61 (“[S]tudents should not be made to bear a costly 
burden for faculty research.”). 
20
  Id. at 145 (“[I]nflated employment and salary rates [at graduation or nine months after] posted by 
law schools helped artificially prop up demand. . . . It is an elaborately constructed mirage.”); id. at 181–
82 (“Schools will be downsized whether they want to or not. . . . The age of indulgence for law schools 
will make way for a time of pain.”). 
21
  This metaphor was first used by Professor Jay Sterling Silver, who defends the value of legal 
research in his review of Failing Law Schools. Jay Sterling Silver, The Case Against Tamanaha’s Motel 
6 Model of Legal Education, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 50 (2012). 
22
  TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 173–76. 
23
  Id. at xii, 12, 41, 173–77. 
24
  Id. at 176–77. 
25
  Id. at 180–81. 
26
  Id. at 170 (“[T]he poor and lower middle class—go without legal assistance. This is reaching 
crisis proportions.”); see also id. at 174–75. 
27
  Id. at 124–26, 177–82. After Philip Schrag critiqued Tamanaha’s description of federal debt 
forgiveness programs as imposing “hardship” on graduates, Tamanaha acknowledged his errors and 
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Unlike his earlier suggestion of lower standards, which he believes would 
expand the supply of law graduates and drive down their wages, 
Tamanaha’s proposals to cap loans or terminate federal debt forgiveness 
programs28 would shrink the supply of law graduates, increase the costs of 
legal services, and reduce opportunities for the poor to attend law school. 
It is unclear whether Tamanaha believes the problem is too many law 
graduates earning too little,29 or too few law graduates earning too much.30 It 
is unclear whether he wants more services for the poor, or wants lower 
taxes and fewer services.31 He supports a variety of changes, some of them 
contradictory, but all of which seem likely to drain resources from law 
schools.32 
II. TAMANAHA’S ERRORS, SELECTIVE CITATIONS, INAPPOSITE 
COMPARISONS, AND QUESTIONABLE ASSUMPTIONS 
To support his argument that the cost of a legal education exceeds its 
economic value, Tamanaha compares the earnings of law graduates to 
college graduates. However, the earnings figures he cites for law graduates 
and lawyers are generally either at an early stage of their careers when 
 
reiterated his opposition to such programs because they subsidize law schools. Philip G. Schrag, Failing 
Law Schools: Brian Tamanaha’s Misguided Missile, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 387, 400–05 (2013); 
Brian Tamanaha, What’s Wrong with Income Based Repayment in Legal Academia: A Response to 
Schrag, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 29, 2012, 6:38 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/11/whats-wrong-
with-income-based-repayment.html. Without apparent irony, Tamanaha proposes a program similar to 
medical residencies for law graduates. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 175. Residencies are partly paid for 
through Medicare and, therefore, taxes. ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., MEDICARE PAYMENTS FOR 
GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION: WHAT EVERY MEDICAL STUDENT, RESIDENT, AND ADVISOR NEEDS 
TO KNOW 2 (2013), available at http://www2.uic.edu/stud_orgs/prof/umsc/documents/ 
medicaregme2013.pdf. Shifting to a Medicare-like model from an income-contingent, forgivable 
student-loan model would increase the costs to taxpayers of training each young lawyer because law 
students would no longer be expected to repay any of the costs of their training. 
28
  TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 180–81 (“[S]chools will place a premium on letting in rich folks 
who don’t need to borrow. . . . [T]here is no clean solution . . . . All things considered, a hard cap would 
seem to be the most viable way to control tuition and enrollment . . . .”). 
29
  Id. at 179–80 (rejecting an inflation-adjusted, per-student cap on student loans because “law 
schools can take in more students—as they have been doing—which would exacerbate the difficulty 
graduates have finding jobs and would increase the total sum of money supplied [to law schools] by the 
government”). 
30
  See id. at 134 (“Students from middle-class and poor families frightened by the specter of taking 
on insurmountable debt will increasingly forgo law school. . . . Our tuition–scholarship matrix helps the 
wealthy consolidate their grip on elite legal positions.”). 
31
  See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
32
  TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 27 (“The real enemy of the middle class and poor is the expensive 
academic model . . . .”); id. at 178–80 (criticizing federal student loans as “a funding program for law 
schools” and advocating a cap on loans); id. at 178 (“Losing federal loan eligibility would be the death 
penalty.”). 
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earnings are relatively low,33 are toward the bottom of the earnings 
distribution for lawyers,34 or are otherwise biased down compared to the 
earnings figures he cites for college graduates.35 
Professor Tamanaha overstates the predictive power of starting 
salaries, and he contradicts his own sources when he states that law 
graduates’ earnings grow slowly and do not typically increase after the first 
ten years. Tamanaha writes that “[t]he earnings of lawyers in this range will 
increase modestly—about ten years out, average earnings peak and remain 
flat thereafter . . . .”36 His source, in fact, states: “By far, the biggest gain 
over the early years of one’s career involves those with Professional 
degrees. Workers with Professional degrees earn 100 percent more in their 
40’s than they do in their initial years in the workforce.”37 
Carnevale et al. find that earnings of generic professional school 
graduates do not peak in their mid-thirties but rather in their forties after 
rapid growth. Other sources also report rapid earnings growth and late 
earnings peaks.38 
A. Lifetime Earnings of Graduates 
Tamanaha is at his best when he critiques empirical studies that 
suggest that generic professional degrees pay off handsomely.39 He 
correctly points out that such studies were not designed to measure the 
specific value of a law degree, the outcomes for generic professional degree 
holders may not reflect those for law degree holders, and law degree 
holders are not the same as lawyers, since many law school graduates do 
not practice law.40 He also points out that these studies assume continuous 
full-time employment, even though many individuals will sometimes work 
part-time or experience periods of unemployment.41 
 
33
  See id. at 140 (discussing starting salaries for law graduates); id. at 141 (discussing earnings 
seven years after graduation from the American Bar Foundation and NALP’s After the JD survey). 
34
  See id. at 139 (comparing median earnings for political science majors to the twenty-fifth 
percentile of earnings for lawyers). 
35
  See infra notes 50–59 and accompanying text. 
36
  TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 140 (citing ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE ET AL., GEORGETOWN UNIV. 
CTR. ON EDUC. & THE WORKFORCE, THE COLLEGE PAYOFF: EDUCATION, OCCUPATIONS, LIFETIME 
EARNINGS 5 (2011), available at http://www9.georgetown.edu/grad/gppi/hpi/cew/pdfs/collegepayoff-
complete.pdf). 
37
  CARNEVALE ET AL., supra note 36. 
38
  E.g., JENNIFER CHEESEMAN DAY & ERIC C. NEWBURGER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BIG 
PAYOFF: EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND SYNTHETIC ESTIMATES OF WORK-LIFE EARNINGS 4–5, 5 
fig.4 (2002), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p23-210.pdf. 
39
  See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 137–38. 
40
  Id. at 137–40. 
41
  Id. at 138. 
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In our own recent article, The Economic Value of a Law Degree,42 we 
overcome these previous studies’ limitations. Our article tracks earnings for 
a large sample of law graduates and compares them to earnings for similar 
college graduates, with appropriate controls for demographic characteristics 
and innate differences in ability and motivation. 
Our most recent data comes from 2013. Although point estimates 
suggest a reversion in premiums from a peak around 2008, we do not find 
evidence of structural changes reducing the law degree premium in recent 
years to below-historical norms. Earnings declined for law graduates, but 
earnings also declined for college graduates, and law graduates maintained 
their historical relative advantage. Figure 1 below, excerpted from our 
recent article, shows the log earnings premium43 for law graduates by year. 
In The Economic Value of a Law Degree, we also consider changes in the 
earnings premium for recent graduates (age twenty-five to thirty) and 
similarly find no evidence that the postrecession law earnings premium for 
this group dropped below normal historical levels.44 
 
42
  Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree (Harvard Law Sch. 
Program on the Legal Profession, Research Paper No. 2013-6, Jan. 14, 2014) [hereinafter Simkovic & 
McIntyre Working Paper Version 2], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2379146. 
43
  A log is similar to a percentage. The log premium will be a bit lower than the percent increase in 
earnings above similar bachelor’s degree holders. 
44
  Our analysis did not include those who graduated after 2008 because data was not available in the 
U.S. Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation. However, a supplemental analysis 
using a sample of young likely law degree holders (professional degree holders excluding those in 
medicine) from the American Community Survey, including more recent graduates, also did not show 
evidence of a decline in the earnings premium. MICHAEL SIMKOVIC & FRANK MCINTYRE, JD EARNINGS 
PREMIUM PROBABLY HAS NOT DECLINED FOR RECENT COHORTS (2013) (on file with the Northwestern 
University Law Review). 
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FIGURE 1: LAW DEGREE EARNINGS PREMIUMS IN RECENT YEARS ARE WITHIN HISTORICAL 








Comparing lifetime earnings of law degree holders to earnings of 
similar bachelor’s degree holders, we find that the pretax value of a law 
degree is approximately $1,030,000 on average, $770,000 at the median, 
$430,000 at the twenty-fifth percentile, and $1,420,000 at the seventy-fifth 
percentile.45 These figures include the opportunity costs of foregone wages 
while in law school and financing costs.46 We also provide separate analyses 
of earnings for men and women. We find that the value of a law degree at 
 
45
  Simkovic & McIntyre Working Paper Version 2, supra note 42, at 24, 38 tbl.6. 
46
  These figures are the aggregate economic value of the law degree, in present value terms at the 
start of law school. Net present value of law degree completion and private benefit to the student can be 
estimated by subtracting federal taxes (around 30%) and tuition from the lifetime earnings premium. 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Survey of Income and Program Participation; 
Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law 
Degree. 
Note: Solid line is the coefficient. Dotted lines represent 95% confidence 
interval. Horizontal dashed line resents multiyear average with each year 
weighted equally. A joint test rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients 
are equal across all years (p<0.001).  
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the median is higher for women than for men because of a larger increase in 
work hours, but at the mean, the value for men and women is similar.47 
Thus, the value of a law degree typically exceeds its costs48 by 
hundreds of thousands of dollars. Even at the twenty-fifth percentile, a law 
degree is typically a profitable investment. 
At current price levels, law degrees generally provide an attractive 
double-digit pretax rate of return.49 Legal education is profitable both for 
students and for the federal government as tax collector and lender. In sum, 
the evidence simply does not support Professor Tamanaha’s thesis. 
B. Inconsistent Assumptions About Age, Experience, Work Status, and the 
Definition of Earnings 
Figure 2 below, abstracted from The Economic Value of a Law Degree, 
highlights the rapid growth of law degree holder earnings relative to 
bachelor’s degree holder earnings as workers gain experience. The pattern 




  Id. at 25. The value at the median is approximately $860,000 for women and $650,000 for men. 
48
  After excluding subsidies from state and local governments and deducting grants and 
scholarships, the average three-year net-tuition cost of a law degree is probably somewhere between 
$80,000 and $100,000. See Enrollment and Degrees Awarded 1963–2012 Academic Years, A.B.A., 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_ 
bar/statistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2014); Internal 
Grants and Scholarships Total Dollar Amount Awarded 1991–2012, A.B.A., http:// 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/ 
statistics/internal_grants_scholarships_awarded.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2014); Law 
School Tuition 1985–2012, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ 
legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/ls_tuition.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 
2014). 
49
  See Simkovic & McIntyre Working Paper Version 2, supra note 42, at 23–24; supra note 48. 
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FIGURE 2: LAW DEGREE HOLDERS’ ANNUAL EARNINGS GROW FASTER AND PEAK LATER THAN 
SIMILAR BACHELOR’S DEGREE HOLDERS’—ANNUAL MEAN EARNINGS BY DEGREE TYPE AND 








As several of the studies Professor Tamanaha cites point out, and as 
our own analysis in The Economic Value of a Law Degree shows, earnings 
typically peak at middle age, between ages fifty and fifty-five. Professional 
degree holders typically start out at higher earnings levels than bachelor’s 
degree holders, and they also usually see their earnings increase at a much 
faster rate and over a longer period of time—that is, professional degree 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Survey of Income Program and Participation; 
Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law 
Degree. 
Note: Includes degree holders who are working, unemployed, or disabled.  
Calculated by fitting a fourth-order polynomial to average earnings for 
five-year age blocks. 
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holders peak higher and later in life than bachelor’s degree holders.50 
Because starting salaries are not a very good predictor of lifetime earnings, 
earnings premiums must be estimated at multiple ages or experience 
intervals. 
This illustrates a problem in Professor Tamanaha’s analysis. He 
compares the earnings of terminal bachelors who majored in political 
science at “midcareer”51—at peak earnings, typically in their forties, with 
around ten to twenty years of work experience52—to the earnings of lawyers 
at all age and experience levels, and excluding high-earning law firm 
partners.53 Because many law graduates who do not make partner transition 
to roles other than legal practice after their first few years, Tamanaha’s 
sample disproportionately includes young and inexperienced law graduates. 
In addition to mismatching age and experience levels, and excluding 
law firm partners, Professor Tamanaha mismatches work statuses54—
exclusively full-time bachelor’s degree holders versus mixed part-time and 
full-time lawyers—in a way that underestimates the earnings of lawyers 
relative to bachelor’s degree holders. 
Moreover, Professor Tamanaha splices together inconsistent 
definitions of earnings from different sources with different sampling and 
reporting biases. His earnings figures for political science majors include 
most bonuses55 while his earnings figures for lawyers generally exclude 
them.56 This inconsistency will bias averages because, for lawyers and other 
 
50
  ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE ET AL., supra note 36, at 4–5 (“By far, the biggest gain over the early 
years of one’s career involves those with Professional degrees. [They] earn 100 percent more in their 
40’s than they do in their initial years in the workforce.”); DAY & NEWBURGER, supra note 38. 
51
  TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 139 (emphasis added); see also Herwig Schlunk, Mamas Don’t Let 
Your Babies Grow Up to Be . . . Lawyers 2 (Vanderbilt Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 09-29, 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1497044 (citing the website Payscale.com, reporting a 2009 
midcareer salary of $77,300 ($83,977 in 2013 dollars) for political science majors). 
52
  See PayScale College Salary Report, Methodology Overview, PAYSCALE, 
http://www.payscale.com/2009-best-colleges/salary-report.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (“Mid-Career 
Employees . . . are full-time employees with at least 10 years of experience in their career or field who 
hold a bachelor’s degree and no higher degrees. For the graduates in this data set, the typical (median) 
mid-career employee is 42 years old and has 15 years of experience.”). 
53
  See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 139 (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics data); Occupational 
Employment Statistics, Frequently Asked Questions, BUREAU LAB. STAT., www.bls.gov/oes/oes_ 
ques.htm (last modified Nov. 22, 2013) (follow “How are ‘employees’ defined by the OES survey?” 
hyperlink) (“‘Employees’ are all part-time and full-time workers who are paid a wage or salary. The 
survey does not cover the self-employed [or] owners and partners in unincorporated firms . . . .”). 
54
  See supra notes 52 and 53 and accompanying text. 
55
  See PayScale College Salary Report Methodology, supra note 52 (Salary “[c]ombines base 
annual salary . . . , bonuses, profit sharing, tips, commissions, overtime, and other forms of cash 
earnings, as applicable. Salary does not include equity (stock) compensation . . . .”). 
56
  See Occupational Employment Statistics, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 53 (follow 
“How are ‘wages’ defined by the OES survey?” hyperlink) (reporting that OES wage data exclude 
“premium pay” such as “[n]on-production bonuses,” but include “[i]ncentive pay,” including 
“[c]ommissions” and “[p]roduction bonuses”). Bonuses to lawyers would likely be classified as 
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high-income individuals, bonus compensation can be substantial relative to 
salary.57 
Under more consistent assumptions about age, experience, work status, 
and the definition of earnings, the earnings figures Professor Tamanaha 
presents as a median for legally inclined college graduates are in fact close 
to the seventy-fifth percentile for that group.58 
Due to these problems, Professor Tamanaha ends up comparing the 
earnings of roughly the seventy-fifth percentile bachelor’s degree holders to 
the earnings of twenty-fifth percentile lawyers.59 In other words, Professor 
Tamanaha asserts that the difference in earnings between law graduates and 
bachelor’s degree holders is largely due to differences in the innate abilities 
and motivation of the students, and that these differences swamp anything 
contributed by a law degree.60 
In The Economic Value of a Law Degree, our analysis of detailed 
demographic data, test scores, grades, college majors, college costs, and 
proxies for motivation, family background, and work preferences suggests 
that ability sorting is modest, accounting for perhaps a 0%–10% earnings 
premium, whereas the overall earnings premium is on the order of 65%–
99%.61 That is, the type of person who could have chosen to attend law 
school might earn slightly more than the typical bachelor’s degree holder, 
even without a law degree. But the disparity in earnings based on 
observable differences is small and does not change our basic conclusions 
that law degrees more than pay for themselves. 
 
nonproduction bonuses because they generally are “not directly related to output of an employee or 
group,” as opposed to commissions measured as a percent of sales. GTP Glossary of Pay Terms, 
BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/respondents/gtp/glossary.htm (last modified Oct. 4, 2012). 
57
  See Joan C. Williams et al., Better on Balance? The Corporate Counsel Work/Life Report, 
10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 367, 430 (2004); William D. Henderson & David Zaring, Young 
Associates in Trouble, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1087, 1097 (2007) (book review) (reporting mean 2005 
bonuses of $17,000 compared to mean salaries of $143,000). 
58
  ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE ET AL., GEORGETOWN UNIV. CTR. ON EDUC. & THE WORKFORCE, 
WHAT’S IT WORTH? THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF COLLEGE MAJORS 34–37 (2011), available at 
http://www9.georgetown.edu/grad/gppi/hpi/cew/pdfs/whatsitworth-complete.pdf (reporting median 
2009 earnings between $42,000 and $55,000 ($46,000 to $60,000 in 2013 dollars) for full-time workers 
with a terminal bachelor’s who majored in psychology and social work, humanities and liberal arts, law 
and public policy, and social sciences and seventy-fifth percentile earnings between $62,000 and 
$87,000 ($67,000 and $95,000 in 2013 dollars)). 
59
  TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 139–40 (“Lawyers who end up in the bottom quartile of lawyer 
earnings, in hindsight, could have . . . earned the same amount with a bachelor’s degree in business, 
engineering, social science, science, or computers. . . . Law students are a smart and motivated bunch so 
it is reasonable to assume that they would have gotten the average earnings [seventy-fifth percentile or 
above earnings because of problems with Tamanaha’s comparison, discussed above] of their fellow 
bachelor’s degree holders.”). 
60
  Id. 
61
  Simkovic & McIntyre Working Paper Version 2, supra note 42, at 8–15, 31 fig.3, 35 tbl.3. We 
may be underestimating the law degree earnings premium because of response biases in the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation, or such bias may offset any remaining selection on unobservables. 
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Tamanaha concludes that lawyers who do not start their careers in big 
firms or who graduate from nonelite schools are doomed to penury.62
 
But 
two of the reports that Tamanaha relies upon contradict his conclusion.63 
Studies show that as law graduates gain experience, those in the practice 
settings with the lowest initial earnings experience the most rapid earnings 
growth.64 Similarly, although graduates of low-ranked schools have lower 
initial earnings, their earnings grow more rapidly than those of graduates of 
elite schools.65 
Tamanaha states that law graduates struggle under crushing debt 
burdens.66 But the American Bar Foundation and NALP’s After the JD II 
survey finds that debt levels do not predict job choice,67 that most law 
graduates report that debt has a minimal effect on other major life 
decisions,68 and that law graduates are able to pay down their student loans 
quickly.69 
To be sure, After the JD tracks law students who graduated in the early 
2000s, when tuition was lower. Nonetheless, publicly available data that we 
summarize in The Economic Value of a Law Degree shows that former law 
students who entered repayment more recently continue to be much less 
likely than former college students or other former advanced degree 
students to default on their student loans.70 
 
62
  TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 140–43 (“At lower-ranked schools only the top 5 percent have a 
chance” of finding a big-law job that will enable them to pay down their debts.). 
63
  See RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., AM. BAR FOUND. & NALP FOUND., AFTER THE JD II: SECOND 
RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS (2009) [hereinafter AFTER THE JD II], 
available at http://www.law.du.edu/documents/directory/publications/sterling/AJD2.pdf; RONIT 
DINOVITZER ET AL., NALP FOUND. & AM. BAR FOUND., AFTER THE JD: FIRST RESULTS OF A NATIONAL 
STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS (2004) [hereinafter AFTER THE JD], available at http:// 
www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/ajd.pdf. 
64
  AFTER THE JD II, supra note 63, at 42. 
65
  Id. at 44 tbl.5.2 (showing earnings roughly seven years after graduation); AFTER THE JD, supra 
note 63, at 44 tbl.5.2 (showing earnings roughly three years after graduation). 
66
  TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 125, 134. 
67
  AFTER THE JD II, supra note 63, at 81–83 (“When we examined the impact of debt on first jobs in 
2003, however, we did not find a strong correlation between levels of debt and job choice. This 
continues to be the case . . . [even though self-reports suggest that some] respondents nevertheless 
appear to feel the weight of their debt in a more global way.”). 
68
  Id. at 81 (“[R]espondents do not believe that their educational debt affected their other life 
choices, such as whether or when to have children or purchase a home.”). 
69
  Although graduates have up to twenty-five years to repay federal student loans under extended 
and income-contingent repayment plans, and the benefits of a legal education typically accrue over an 
even longer period, within three years of graduation, 16% of law graduates in the After the JD study had 
no educational debt. Four years later, 36% of those graduates had no education debt. In four years, 
median debt levels of those with debt dropped from $70,000 to $50,000, and the percent of graduates 
with more than $100,000 in debt dropped from 21% to 8%. Id. at 80–82, 81 tbl.10.1, 82 fig.10.1, 82 
tbl.10.2. 
70
  Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree 48 fig.7, tbls.11 & 
12 (Harvard Law Sch. Program on the Legal Profession, Research Paper No. 2013-6, Aug. 14, 2013) 
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C. Reliance on Flawed Studies and Questionable Assumptions 
Professor Tamanaha praises manuscripts by law professors who concur 
with his conclusions.71 But their methodologies suffer from questionable 
assumptions. 
For example, Professor Schlunk’s analysis assumes astronomical 
discount rates, low earnings growth rates, and zero inflation for thirty-five 
years.72 None of these assumptions are empirically or theoretically 
justifiable.73 
Most studies by economists have generally used a discount rate 
between 2.5% and 3%.74 Some studies have related appropriate discount 
rates to the actual student loan interest rates faced by prospective students.75 
Compared with the 3% discount rates applied in labor market studies by 
economists and suggested by the real (net-inflation) costs of financing a law 
degree with federal student loans,76 Professor Schlunk applies real discount 
rates of between 8% and 27%.77 
If Professor Schlunk had used comparable assumptions about discount 
rates to evaluate the value of a college degree compared to a high school 
diploma, he would have reached the conclusion that few should go to 
 
[hereinafter Simkovic & McIntyre Working Paper Version 1], available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2250585. 
71
  TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 217 n.18 (citing Jim Chen, A Degree of Practical Wisdom: The 
Ratio of Educational Debt to Income as a Basic Measurement of Law School Graduates’ Economic 
Viability, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1185 (2012); Schlunk, supra note 51). 
72
  Schlunk, supra note 51, at 9–11, 9 n.15. 
73
  See generally Simkovic & McIntyre Working Paper Version 2, supra note 42. 
74
  See, e.g., SANDY BAUM ET AL., COLLEGE BOARD, EDUCATION PAYS 2010, at 12 fig.1.2, available 
at http://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/education-pays-2010-full-report.pdf (applying a 3% 
discount rate); CARNEVALE ET AL., supra note 36, at 21 (proposing a 2.5% discount rate); DAY & 
NEWBURGER, supra note 50 (using no discount rate); EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, A GUIDE TO BENEFIT–
COST ANALYSIS 168 (2d. ed. 1990) (encouraging the use of approximately a 3% discount rate in benefit–
cost analysis); Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, Welcome to the Club: The Returns to an Elite Degree for 
American Lawyers 37 n.18 (Dec. 11, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LEO/Oyer_WelcometotheClub.pdf (“We believe that 10% is 
probably too large a discount factor . . . .”). 
75
  See, e.g., James J. Heckman et al., Earnings Functions, Rates of Return and Treatment Effects: 
The Mincer Equation and Beyond, in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 307, 313 (Eric 
A. Hanushek & Finis Welch eds., 2006) (discussing the traditional view that “[i]f the IRR [internal rate 
of return] exceeds the interest rate, further investment in education is warranted”); Ronald G. Ehrenberg, 
An Economic Analysis of the Market for Law School Students 21 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 2602, 1988), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w2602.pdf?new_ 
window=1. 
76
  Simkovic & McIntyre Working Paper Version 1, supra note 70, at 52–55. 
77
  Herwig Schlunk, Mamas 2011: Is a Law Degree a Good Investment Today?, 36 J. LEGAL PROF. 
301, 318 (2012); Schlunk, supra note 51, at 11. 
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college. Indeed, given a 30% nominal discount rate, whether it makes 
financial sense to complete high school might be debatable.78 
Professor Chen assumes that the debt-to-income ratios used by 
mortgage lenders can be applied to law students.79 But law graduates 
experience rapid earnings growth, making debt-to-income ratios at 
graduation poor predictors. 
Moreover, the meaning of financial ratios is context specific.80 Chen 
does not consider actual law student loan performance.81 Publicly available 
data unambiguously show that law students have extremely low default 
rates relative to other student borrowers even though they have high debt 
levels.82 This was true both before and after federal income-based debt 
forgiveness programs became available. And because we can see the 
difference in relative default rates across programs with access to the same 
loan terms, we can rule out the possibility that more generous terms are 
driving lower law student defaults. 
III. TAMANAHA’S PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Professor Tamanaha’s diagnosis is incorrect. But that does not 
necessarily mean that his prescriptions are. Tamanaha makes a variety of 
suggestions for reforms of legal education, some of which already exist in 
certain places. Natural variation in practices among law schools and 
differences in regulations between states present opportunities to evaluate 
the likely impact of different reforms through rigorous empirical research. 
Some of the proposed reforms may not have the effects Tamanaha 
anticipates, or may come with unforeseen drawbacks. Others may turn out 
to be beneficial. These are ultimately empirical questions, and we will be 
interested to see what, if any, changes to legal education emerge as 
successful in the years to come. 
A. Reduce Access to Student Loans 
For example, Professor Tamanaha concludes that the cost of legal 
education and student loan burdens are the primary barriers preventing law 
 
78
  Professor Schlunk might maintain that his discount rate reflects the high risks of a law degree. In 
The Economic Value of a Law Degree, we find that law degrees are good investments even at the low 
end of returns. Risk to law students is further reduced through loan forgiveness programs available to 
low-income graduates, while risk to taxpayers is mitigated through high student loan interest rates, low 
default rates, and progressive taxation of successful graduates. 
79
  Chen, supra note 71, at 1191. 
80
  See, e.g., JOHN R. GRAHAM & SCOTT B. SMART, INTRODUCTION TO CORPORATE FINANCE 41 
(abr. ed., 3d ed. 2012) (“[A] normal ratio in one industry may be highly unusual in another.”); JAMES M. 
WAHLEN ET. AL, FINANCIAL REPORTING, FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS, AND VALUATION 247 (7th 
ed. 2010) (noting that “ratios differ across industries”). 
81
  See generally Chen, supra note 71. 
82
  Simkovic & McIntyre Working Paper Version 1, supra note 70, at 45–49. 
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graduates from serving the poor.83 But the After the JD and After the JD II 
studies do not provide much support for this view.84 Even if debt is a 
deterrent, perhaps all that is needed is to explain better how student loan 
forgiveness now works. Federal programs cap debt service payments as a 
share of disposable income and forgive the remaining student loan balance 
after ten years of public service.85 The higher students’ debt levels, the more 
valuable debt forgiveness and the more attractive public interest work 
becomes relative to private practice. If law schools were to charge more and 
student debt levels were to increase, public interest work would become 
more financially attractive relative to private practice.86 Tamanaha’s 
revenue-cutting proposal also may devalue the law schools’ own internally 
funded debt-forgiveness programs, which subsidize low-income graduates 
working in the public sector. Professor Tamanaha’s proposed reforms—
cutting law school tuition to reduce debt and capping federal student loans 
to law students—would effectively reduce government and law school 
subsidies to public interest work and would make law graduates more likely 
to prefer lucrative jobs in the private sector. 
Tamanaha’s proposals risk reducing the relative attractiveness of 
public service by converting programs that make subsidies contingent on 
public service into ones that provide subsidies to all.87 
The most plausible reason that many law graduates prefer private 
practice over public service is not that they are overburdened with debt, but 
rather that the pay differential is simply too large. It is not surprising that—
given a choice between serving the poor and working for the rich—many 
 
83
  See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 134 (“Current law graduates are compelled by their debt to seek 
corporate law jobs that many do not otherwise desire.”). 
84
  See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
85
  Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program, FED. STUDENT AID (Dec. 2013), 
http://studentaid.ed.gov/sites/default/files/public-service-loan-forgiveness.pdf. Graduates working in the 
private sector are eligible for debt forgiveness after twenty to twenty-five years, and those whose 
incomes are too high relative to their debts are ineligible. See Income-Based Plan, FED. STUDENT AID, 
http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/understand/plans/income-based (last visited Jan. 14, 2014); Pay as 
You Earn Plan, FED. STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/understand/plans/pay-as-you-
earn (last visited Jan. 14, 2014). 
86
  Law schools’ abilities to cross-subsidize public interest work may be limited by competition 
between law schools for students. Students interested in private sector work would likely avoid a law 
school that increased tuition too much to try to subsidize public interest work. 
87
  One small study of New York University (NYU) law students found that students who received a 
tuition discount, contingent on working in public interest, were more likely to enroll at NYU and to 
work in public interest than those who received economically similar debt repayment assistance through 
NYU, also contingent on public interest work. Erica Field, Educational Debt Burden and Career 
Choice: Evidence from a Financial Aid Experiment at NYU Law School, AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON., 
Jan. 2009, at 1. This study does not support Tamanaha’s policy prescription because tuition reduction 
was contingent on public interest work—the student would be forced to repay the tuition discount if he 
or she worked in the private sector. This is distinct from the unconditional tuition reduction proposed by 
Tamanaha. At the time of the NYU study, federal income contingent debt forgiveness programs were 
not available, and these were implemented prospectively. 
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law graduates would prefer to eat well, dress well, live in good 
neighborhoods, and purchase good health care and education for themselves 
and their children. Many Americans would prefer the same things, if they 
were fortunate enough to have the same opportunities.88 
Tamanaha does suggest one interesting option to reduce student debt 
burdens. Universities could begin financing their own law students rather 
than relying on the federal government or private lenders to do so.89 
Leaving aside concerns about scale, expertise, and diversification of risk, 
this suggestion is promising. Law graduates have high incomes and 
relatively low default rates. Federal student loans to graduate students—in 
particular Grad Plus loans—are relatively expensive. A lender with low 
customer acquisition and administrative costs could potentially undercut the 
federal government’s prices, reduce students’ financing costs, and still turn 
a profit on the loans.90 
B. Reduce Faculty Resources 
Tamanaha concludes that faculty compensation, research support, and 
tenure protections can be reduced without any long-term impact on the 
quality of instruction at law schools. This assertion is based in part on his 
belief that “law professors have been doing swimmingly well compared to 
most lawyers for some time now.”91 
But Tamanaha’s claim that most law faculty earn more than most 
lawyers is incorrect. To the contrary, law professors earn less than lawyers 
at every point in the earnings distribution. Figure 3 below shows earnings at 
the tenth, twenty-fifth, fiftieth, and seventy-fifth percentiles and at the mean 
for lawyers and law professors. All data comes from the U.S. Department of 
Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Employment Statistics.92 
Tamanaha uses this data for lawyer earnings, but he overlooks the 
availability of law professor earnings from the same source.93 
 
88
  Indeed, Professor Tamanaha concludes that recipients of merit scholarships are the most likely to 
secure high-paid jobs, notwithstanding merit scholars’ low debt burdens. TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 
98. 
89
  Id. at 180. 
90
  See Michael Simkovic, Risk-Based Student Loans, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527, 606–07 (2013). 
91
  TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 48. 
92
  Data are inflation adjusted to 2013. 
93
  See id. at 50–51. 
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Earnings for law professors are lower than those for lawyers, even though 
the lawyer data excludes high-earning law firm partners94 and many of the 
lawyers will have less work experience than law professors.95 Moreover, 
observable differences between future law professors and future lawyers in 
academic performance, caliber of law school attended, and credentials, such 
as federal judicial clerkships,96 suggest that the typical law professor could 
 
94
  See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
95
  Median lawyer age is roughly forty-nine—although as noted above, the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics group will likely be younger because it excludes solo practitioners and partners—while median 
law faculty age is fifty-six to sixty. See 2008–2009 AALS Statistical Report on Law Faculty, Gender and 
Age, ASS’N AM. L. SCHOOLS (2009), http://www.aals.org/statistics/2009dlt/gender.html; Lawyer 
Demographics, A.B.A. (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/ 
PublicDocuments/lawyer_demographics_2012_revised.authcheckdam.pdf. 
96
  See Donna Fossum, Law Professors: A Profile of the Teaching Branch of the Legal Profession, 
1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 501; Daniel Martin Katz et al., Reproduction of Hierarchy? A Social 
Network Analysis of the American Law Professoriate, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 76 (2011); 2008–2009 AALS 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Occupational Employment Statistics; Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
Note: Lawyers excludes law firm partners and solo practitioners. 
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probably have earned more than the typical lawyer if the professor had 
chosen to practice law instead of teaching. 
Tamanaha presents a distorted view of law faculty compensation by 
focusing on the pinnacle of the profession—faculty at elite law schools, the 
highest paid law school deans, and tenured full professors who typically 
have decades of work experience and are near peak earnings.97 Most law 
professors earn far less for most of their academic careers. Tamanaha also 
confuses “full” professors—the most senior, experienced, and highly paid 
professors who have obtained tenure—with “full-time” professors—those 
whose full-time job is working as a professor, including lower paid 
assistant, associate, and nontenure-track faculty.98 Because of these errors, 
Tamanaha dramatically overestimates typical law professor earnings, and 
therefore underestimates the opportunity cost of choosing law teaching over 
law practice. 
This does not necessarily mean that law professors are 
undercompensated. As Tamanaha rightly notes, lower earnings may reflect 
a compensating differential for more pleasant work.99 But he fails to 
appreciate that the existing wage structure already incorporates differences 
between the kinds of work performed by lawyers and law professors. 
Tamanaha’s claim that faculty compensation could be dramatically 
reduced without any long-term impact on the quality of legal education 
seems unlikely. Several empirical studies have examined the role of faculty 
compensation in recruitment and retention at the undergraduate level. They 
find that universities must offer compensation that is reasonably 
competitive with that available in the private sector or face shortages of 
qualified instructors in high-value, high-wage fields.100 
 
Statistical Report on Law Faculty, Faculty with JD/LLB Degrees from AALS Affiliated Law Schools, 
ASS’N AM. L. SCHOOLS (2009), http://www.aals.org/statistics/2009dlt/JD.pdf. 
97
  TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 48–50. 
98
  Id. at 49 (“According to . . . SALT, the average median salary of full-time professors in 2008–9 
was $147,000 . . . .” (emphasis added)); cf. 2008–09 SALT Salary Survey, SALT EQUALIZER (Soc’y of 
Am. Law Teachers, St. Paul, Minn.), Mar. 2009, at 1. 
99
  See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 187. 
100
  See, e.g., RICHARD B. FREEMAN, THE MARKET FOR COLLEGE-TRAINED MANPOWER: A STUDY 
IN THE ECONOMICS OF CAREER CHOICE 165–67 (1971) (documenting shortages of faculty in high-
demand fields in the United States in the 1960s); MIKE HORSLEY ET AL., OVAL RESEARCH CENTRE, 
SALARY RELATIVITIES AND THE ACADEMIC LABOUR MARKET 47–79 (n.d.), available at 
http://docs.glotta.ntua.gr/International/academic_salaries.pdf (documenting Australian universities’ 
difficulty hiring faculty when candidates were qualified for more highly paid private sector work); 
Ronald Ehrenberg et al., Faculty Turnover at American Colleges and Universities: Analyses of AAUP 
Data, 10 ECON. EDUC. REV. 99, 99–110 (1991) (confirming the importance of salary to faculty 
retention); Faculty Salaries Vary by Institution Type, Discipline, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 11, 
2011), http://chronicle.com/article/Faculty-Salaries-Vary-by/127073 (presenting data showing that 
faculty salaries are highest in law, business, economics, computer science, engineering, and health 
science, and lowest in performing arts, education, and the humanities). 
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Law professors in technical fields are drawn from the same pool of 
talent as doctors, lawyers, bankers, consultants, corporate executives, and 
government officials. Except for a small minority, they are motivated at 
least in part by compensation. While senior faculty may find it difficult to 
retrain for a different occupation, high-performing recent college and law 
school graduates can and will choose other occupations if faculty 
compensation and opportunities for research are reduced too much, and the 
quality of personnel at law schools will decline. 
Professors place a high monetary value on tenure, and a university that 
unilaterally eliminated tenure would either have to pay more or suffer a loss 
in faculty quality. After controlling for faculty quality, university rank, and 
cost of living, university economics departments that are less likely to offer 
faculty tenure must pay untenured faculty more, in part to compensate for 
increased risk.101 
Despite the well-known problems of tenure, some claim that it can 
actually enhance efficiency from an institutional perspective because it 
encourages senior faculty to share their knowledge and hire the most 
talented junior faculty rather than attempt to protect their turf from potential 
competitors.102 Tenure also encourages faculty to invest in highly 
specialized knowledge103 and compete in a winner-take-all tournament.104 
Whether this is enough to counterbalance post-tenure incentive problems 
remains to be seen. 
Empirical studies show that the most highly qualified faculty value low 
teaching loads and academic prestige.105 This suggests that highly talented 
faculty may be unlikely to agree to teach heavy loads at low-ranked (i.e., 
nonresearch) institutions unless they are well-compensated financially. 
Professor Tamanaha concludes that low-cost, untenured, part-time, or 
adjunct faculty can be used to bring down costs without much loss to 
instructional quality.106 Empirical studies have examined instructional 
 
101
  Ronald G. Ehrenberg et al., Do Economics Departments with Lower Tenure Probabilities Pay 
Higher Faculty Salaries?, 80 REV. ECON. & STAT. 503 (1998). The study found that higher tenure 
standards may also increase pay because they increase reliance on lateral hires and motivate faculty to 
be more productive. Id. at 503–04. 
102
  Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Rethinking the Professoriate 5 (Cornell Univ. Sch. of Indus. & Labor 
Relations, Working Paper, 2010), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1142&context=workingpapers. 
103
  See Michael S. McPherson & Gordon C. Winston, The Economics of Academic Tenure: A 
Relational Perspective, in MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON ET AL., PAYING THE PIPER: PRODUCTIVITY, 
INCENTIVES, AND FINANCING IN U.S. HIGHER EDUCATION 109, 110, 115–19 (1993).  
104
  See Aloysius Siow, The Organization of the Market for Professors 18 (Univ. of Toronto Dep’t 
of Econ. & Inst. for Policy Analysis, Working Paper No. UT-ECIPA-SIOW-95-01, 1995). 
105
  See Edward R. Morey & Jennifer A. Thacher, Using Choice Experiments and Latent-Class 
Modeling to Investigate and Estimate How Academic Economists Value and Trade Off the Attributes of 
Academic Positions 27 (Nov. 26, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
www.colorado.edu/economics/morey/papers/MoreyThacher_LCFaculty_withTables.pdf. 
106
  See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 12, 44, 174, 182. 
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staffing at four-year bachelor’s degree programs and community colleges. 
Although it is unclear if the results are generalizable to low-cost law 
schools, the data generally do not support Tamanaha’s views. 
When four-year colleges increase the use of either full-time, 
nontenure-track faculty or part-time faculty, most studies find that 
undergraduate students become more likely to drop out in their first year 
and less likely to graduate.107 Similarly, increased use of part-time faculty 
by community colleges appears to reduce the likelihood that students will 
either complete an associate’s degree or transfer to a four-year college.108 
Worse outcomes for students of adjuncts and part-time faculty may be due 
in part to the heavy teaching loads that such faculty must take on, 
sometimes at multiple institutions, to make ends meet.109 
Different outcomes may also be explained in part by differences in job 
security between full-time, tenured research professors and adjuncts. 
Adjuncts typically give higher grades than full-time faculty, apparently 
because they face greater pressure to obtain high course evaluations so that 
their contracts will be renewed.110 Professors can increase enrollments and 
boost course evaluations by assigning better grades for less work because 
students actively shop for such classes.111 Students also give better course 
evaluations to professors who grade more generously and who flatter 
students—and worse evaluations to those who demand more work and 
more substantive learning.112 
 
107
  See, e.g., Eric P. Bettinger & Bridget Terry Long, The Increasing Use of Adjunct Instructors at 
Public Institutions: Are We Hurting Students?, in WHAT’S HAPPENING TO PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION? 
51, 51, 68 (Ronald G. Ehrenberg ed., 2006); Ronald G. Ehrenberg, American Higher Education in 
Transition, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2012, at 193; Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Liang Zhang, Do Tenured 
and Tenure-Track Faculty Matter?, 40 J. HUM. RESOURCES 647 (2005); cf. Eric P. Bettinger & Bridget 
Terry Long, Does Cheaper Mean Better? The Impact of Using Adjunct Instructors on Student Outcomes, 
92 REV. ECON. & STATS. 598, 608–09 (2010). 
108
  M. Kevin Eagan Jr. & Audrey J. Jaeger, Effects of Exposure to Part-Time Faculty on Community 
College Transfer, 50 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 168 (2009) (explaining the negative effects on the likelihood 
of transferring); Daniel Jacoby, Effects of Part-Time Faculty Employment on Community College 
Graduation Rates, 77 J. HIGHER EDUC. 1081 (2006) (explaining the negative effects on graduation 
rates); Audrey J. Jaeger & M. Kevin Eagan, Jr., Unintended Consequences: Examining the Effect of 
Part-Time Faculty Members on Associate’s Degree Completion, 36 COMMUNITY. C. REV. 167 (2009) 
(explaining the negative effects on probability of completing an associate’s degree). 
109
  Ehrenberg, supra note 102, at 7. 
110
  Brenda S. Sonner, A Is for “Adjunct”: Examining Grade Inflation in Higher Education, 76 J. 
EDUC. FOR BUS., Sept.–Oct. 2000, at 5, 7. 
111
  Talia Bar et al., Grade Information and Grade Inflation: The Cornell Experiment, J. ECON. 
PERSP., Summer 2009, at 93, 101–02 (presenting evidence “that the provision of [average] grade [and 
grade distribution] information [to Cornell students] led to increased enrollment into leniently graded 
courses” and that students of high ability were less likely than students of lower ability to pursue courses 
with more lenient grading). 
112
  See Scott E. Carrell & James E. West, Does Professor Quality Matter? Evidence from Random 
Assignment of Students to Professors, 118 J. POL. ECON. 409, 412, 430 (2010). 
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Education is a complex market with known principal–agent problems. 
Tamanaha proposes reducing licensing and accreditation standards and 
letting students decide for themselves which classes to take.113 But treating 
students as customers could reduce rigor because many professors, 
particularly those who are insecure about their jobs, respond to such 
incentives by easing classroom workloads and inflating grades.114 The result 
may be that student customers study less, learn less, and are less prepared 
for the professional world.115 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that at current compensation levels, 
nonelite law schools struggle to find qualified full-time, tenure-track 
instructors in technical areas that are valued in the labor market. This 
includes fields such as taxation, financial regulation, patents, energy, health 
care, bankruptcy, and commercial law.116 But it is precisely these areas that 
offer the most lucrative employment opportunities for law graduates and 
where law schools committed to providing a high earnings premium should 
be expanding their course offerings and full-time faculty.117 
C. Shorter, Deregulated Legal Education 
Professor Tamanaha advocates two-year law degrees as a bold reform 
that he anticipates the legal establishment will resist.118 However, under the 
current system, only one year of law school is necessary to practice law in 
the largest legal markets, New York and California.119 To sit for the bar 
 
113
  TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 174 (“Prospective students will be able to pick the legal education 
program they want at a price they can afford.”). 
114
  See Donald Larry Crumbley et al., What Is Ethical About Grade Inflation and Coursework 
Deflation?, 8 J. ACAD. ETHICS 187, 187 (2010) (arguing that course evaluations have “caused grade 
inflation, coursework deflation, and a reduction in student learning as a result of unethical behavior of 
professors and administrators”); David A. Love & Matthew J. Kotchen, Grades, Course Evaluations, 
and Academic Incentives, 36 E. ECON. J. 151, 151 (2010) (modeling professor behavior and suggesting 
that increased emphasis on course evaluations can lead to grade inflation). 
115
  See generally Philip Babcock, Real Costs of Nominal Grade Inflation? New Evidence from 
Student Course Evaluations, 48 ECON. INQUIRY 983 (2010) (providing evidence that higher nominal 
grades (i.e., grade inflation) can dramatically reduce student effort and study time). 
116
  One of us knows several gifted and scholarly practitioners who have turned down opportunities 
to become full-time professors because of inadequate compensation, as well as several law schools that 
reluctantly use adjuncts or faculty who specialize in other areas to teach classes in these areas. 
117
  See, e.g., Hillary Mantis, Practice Areas that Are Hiring, NAT’L JURIST (Feb. 15, 2013), 
http://www.nationaljurist.com/content/practice-areas-are-hiring; Michael Morella, Consider a Legal 
Career in Health or Intellectual Property, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 13, 2012), 
http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/articles/2012/03/13/consider-
a-legal-career-in-health-or-intellectual-property; Christina Thomas, Intellectual Property, Patent 
Litigation Still a Hot Practice Area, NAT’L JURIST, (Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.nationaljurist.com/ 
content/intellectual-property-patent-litigation-still-hot-practice-area. 
118
  TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 172–76. 
119
  Tamanaha obliquely notes that “[a] handful of states, which have their own accreditation 
procedures, do not require graduation from an ABA accredited law school for admission to their bar” 
and concludes that “if the states with the largest legal markets were to do so, tuition at the lower-ranked 
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exam in these states, applicants need only complete a minimum of one year 
of law school and then apprentice with a lawyer.120 Tamanaha advocates 
something similar as a national model, but he presents no information on 
how outcomes for those who have pursued prebar apprenticeships in lieu of 
the second or third year of law school compare to outcomes for graduates of 
traditional law schools. 
Perhaps such apprenticeship-trained lawyers would be difficult to 
study because they are rare. But if students and employers do not use the 
apprenticeship model in states where it is already available—or if those 
who do use it disproportionately fail the bar exam121—what will be 
accomplished by introducing it nationally? Perhaps there is a version of 
such a program that will work, but as of now, few avail themselves of the 
option. 
Professor Tamanaha praises low-cost and unaccredited law schools,122 
but he neglects to systematically evaluate whether low net tuition reflects 
efficiency, differences in state subsidies,123 or inferior quality contributing 
to worse student outcomes after controlling for differences in student 
characteristics.124 Among nonprofit universities, colleges with higher tuition 
prices generally spend more on instruction per student, and, after 
controlling for student characteristics, their graduates appear to earn more 
money.125 
 
law schools would fall.” Id. at 176–77. But California and New York are the two states with the largest 
legal markets by total employment and earnings for lawyers, collectively accounting for more than 23% 
of employment and 27% of earnings. See Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2012, 23-1011 
Lawyers, BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes231011.htm (last modified Mar. 29, 
2013). 
120
  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6060 (West 2003); N.Y. CT. R. § 520.4. 
121
  Raw data from the National Conference of Bar Examiners suggests that those who read for the 
bar exam or attend non-ABA-accredited law schools have lower bar passage rates. See Bar Examination 
and Admission Statistics, NAT’L CONF. B. EXAMINERS, http://www.ncbex.org/publications/statistics (last 
visited Jan. 14, 2014). 
122
  TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 12, 18–19, 184–85. 
123
  Tamanaha condemns Berkeley, Michigan, Virginia, and UCLA because he thinks that they 
“abdicated their public mission in order to pursue rankings, following the expensive private research-
university model.” Id. at 184. But Professor Tamanaha fails to systematically consider how changes in 
level of taxpayer support per student may drive tuition increases and cost/quality tradeoffs at state 
schools. 
124
  Professor Tamanaha notes that one low-ranked law school’s tuition increased after it was taken 
over by a for-profit company and gained accreditation, but he neglects to consider whether the increase 
in pricing might be for a reason other than market power conferred by accreditation, for example, the 
tendency of for-profit managers to try to maximize profit. See id. at 18–19; see also id. at 197 n.27 
(acknowledging that unaccredited law schools have lower bar passage rates than accredited law schools, 
but attributing this to differences in student characteristics—without presenting any data on underlying 
student characteristics or citing or performing any formal empirical analysis). 
125
  Stacy Berg Dale & Alan B. Krueger, Estimating the Payoff to Attending a More Selective 
College: An Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1491, 1524 
(2002) (“We do find that students who attend colleges with higher average tuition costs tend to earn 
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IV. LOW-COST SOLUTIONS THAT TAMANAHA OPPOSES 
Professor Tamanaha wants more low-cost options for legal 
education,126 but he denigrates many low-cost opportunities currently 
available to law students. 
Thanks to aggressive competition between law schools for students 
with high grades and test scores, students with above-average abilities often 
can benefit from tuition discounting by attending a lower ranked 
institution.127 Such scholarships enable students to obtain a legal education 
at low or no direct cost, enable students of limited means but strong 
motivation and ability to attend law school, and reward law schools that 
provide such scholarships with a higher ranking and a more vibrant 
community. But to Professor Tamanaha, merit-based scholarships are 
“malign,”128 “indefensible,”129 and “help[] the wealthy consolidate their grip 
on elite legal positions.”130 
Tamanaha overlooks the possibility that differences in outcomes 
between graduates of different law schools may simply be due to 
differences in the abilities of the incoming students.131 He also overlooks the 
possibility that peer effects from high performers may help lower 
performing classmates,132 instead viewing law school as a zero-sum 
competition. 
Opportunity costs can be minimized by attending law school part-time 
or at night while working a full-time job. According to the 2014 ABA–LSAC 
Official Guide to ABA-Approved Law Schools, more than a hundred ABA-
approved law schools offer part-time programs.133 But Professor Tamanaha 
condemns law schools for opening part-time programs to students who are 
 
higher income years later, after adjusting for student characteristics. . . . [T]uition matters because higher 
cost schools devote more resources to student instruction.”). 
126
  See TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 172–75. 
127
  Almost all ABA-approved law schools offer at least some scholarships that cover half or full 
tuition. At twenty-five law schools, 30% or more of full-time students receive such large scholarships. 
2014 ABA–LSAC Official Guide to ABA-Approved Law Schools, LSAC, https://officialguide.lsac.org/ 
release/OfficialGuide_Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 14, 2014). 
128
  TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 99. 
129
  Id. at 98. 
130
  Id. at 134. 
131
  Dale & Krueger, supra note 125, at 1523 (finding that college selectivity does not predict higher 
earnings after controlling for student ability levels); Richard Sander & Jane Bambauer, The Secret of My 
Success: How Status, Eliteness, and School Performance Shape Legal Careers, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 893 (2012) (finding that earnings and likelihood of making partner depends more on individual 
law school grades than on institutional law school prestige); cf. Oyer & Schaefer, supra note 74. 
132
  See Gordon C. Winston & David J. Zimmerman, Peer Effects in Higher Education, in COLLEGE 
CHOICES: THE ECONOMICS OF WHERE TO GO, WHEN TO GO, AND HOW TO PAY FOR IT 395, 418 
(Caroline M. Hoxby ed., 2004); Ron Zimmer, A New Twist in the Educational Tracking Debate, 
22 ECON. EDUC. REV. 307, 313–14 (2003). 
133
  2014 ABA–LSAC Official Guide to ABA-Approved Law Schools, supra note 127. 
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not necessarily working full-time but are academically less well-prepared 
than full-time students. Tamanaha faults law schools for “stigmatizing” 
part-time students and using part-time programs to exploit “a loophole” in 
U.S. News rankings.134 He dismisses the possibility that some students may 
benefit from a slower pace in their first year of law school as “hooey,”135 
and overlooks the possibility that part-time programs may need a minimum 
number of students to be financially viable. 
CONCLUSION 
Tamanaha’s attack on legal education comes at a time of economic 
recession. The challenging employment market faced by recent law 
graduates is likely not the result of long-term problems in legal education, 
but rather is a direct result of broader economic problems that are having an 
even harsher impact on those with less education. It is unfortunate if some 
students relying on faulty information have made the costly decision to 
terminate their educations with bachelor’s degrees when they would have 
benefited handsomely from a law degree. 
Like all institutions, law schools are far from perfect. They must 
continuously strive to improve, to expend fewer resources in areas with low 
rates of return, and to focus more resources in areas that can do the most 
good for their students and for the rest of society. Educational institutions 
can be slow to move, and we hope Professor Tamanaha’s advocacy will 
focus greater attention on efficiency and productive use of resources. 
Constructive reforms, however, must be built on good data, rigorous 
analysis, and an accurate understanding of the status quo ante. Whatever 
one’s preference for change, the data is clear: law schools typically provide 





  TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 86. 
135
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